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	 I	must	admit	that	I	have	only	two	intellectual	heroes.		One	was	Jerry	Fodor;	the	other	is	Noam	Chomsky.		Despite	my	deep	respect	for	Fodor	and	his	work,	I	had	only	the	briefest	of	interactions	with	him,	limited	to	a	few	comments	and	questions	at	conferences	and	workshops.		For	more	personal	insights,	I	rely	on	others.		On	this	score,	Georges	Rey	tells	the	following	story	that	is	both	amusing	and,	I	think,	illuminating:		I	once	asked	him,	“Jerry,	you	probably	know	more	scientific	psychology	than	any	other	philosopher:	why,	when	you	give	an	example	of	a	psychological	law,	do	you	take	a	trivial	folk	example,	such	as	Eating	potato	chips	can	make	you	want	to	eat	more,	instead	of	any	serious	ones	from	actual	psychology?”		Without	hesitation,	he	replied,	“Citing	the	science	would	be	vulgar”.	(Rey,	2018,	p.	335.)1	I	cannot	vouch	for	Fodor	knowing	more	scientific	psychology	than	any	other	philosopher,	but	Fodor’s	habit	was	very	much	in	evidence	when	he	explained	that	human	cognition	is	systematic	by	claiming,	“no	native	speaker	comes	to	understand	the	form	of	words	‘John	loves	Mary’	except	as	he	also	comes	to	understand	the	form	of	words	‘Mary	loves	John’.”		(Fodor,	1987,	p.	150).				 I	note	Fodor’s	stylistic	idiosyncrasy	because	it	is	one,	among	many,	reasons	that	can	make	the	systematicity	arguments	difficult	to	follow	and	evaluate.		Indeed,	some	have	suggested	that	such	simple,	or	simplistic,	formulations	as	Fodor,	and	others	following	him,	invoke	are	not	scientific.2	Others	have	observed	that	Fodor	does	not	document	the	existence	of	systematicity	through	references	to	the	scientific	literature,	so	that	the	systematicity	of	thought	is	a	myth	or	a	hoax.3				 This	paper	will	try	to	compensate	a	bit	for	Fodor’s	idiosyncrasy	by	reviewing	some	of	his	and	Chomsky’s	work	in	linguistics	in	the	1960s.	This	history	will	(I	hope)	provide	a	new	angle	on	the	systematicity	arguments.	It	will,	first	and	foremost,	draw	attention	to	part	of	the	basis	Fodor	had	for	thinking	that	thought	has	systematic	features.		Second,	it	will	help	focus	attention	on	a	key	feature	of	the	systematicity	arguments,	namely,	a	role	for	some	notion	of	what	is	ad	hoc.	Third,	and	finally,	it	will	provide	a	reason	to	be	skeptical	of	the	hypothesis	that	the	systematicity	of	thought	derives	from	the	systematicity	of	language.4	Section	1	will	review	the	systematicity	arguments	highlighting	three	important	concepts,	namely,	productivity,	systematicity,	and	the	idea	of	the	ad	hoc.	Section	2	will	review	the	discussion	of	the	productivity	of	natural	language	in	Fodor	(1961),	Katz	et	al.	(1963),	and	Chomsky	(1964).	This	review	helps	us	see	how	Fodor	adapted	his	early	thinking	about	the	productivity	of	natural	language	into	a	case	for	the	existence	of	systematic	features	of	thought	and	a	compositional	explanation	of	them	that	is	not	ad	hoc.		Section	3	will	draw	attention	to	Chomsky’s	idea	that	good	explanations	in	linguistics	require	more	than	that	a	grammar	generate	all	and	only	the	sentences	of	a	language.	There	are,	in	addition,	considerations	of	what	is	simpler	and	not	ad	hoc.	Such	considerations	underlie	the	sense	that	the	systematicity	arguments	are	instances	of	inference	to	the	best	explanation	wherein	what	makes	for	a	better	explanation	is	a	kind	of	simplicity	and	avoidance	of	the	ad	hoc.	Section	4	will	try	to	show	how	the	considerations	developed	in	sections	2	continue	to	be	theoretically	and	empirically																																																									1	This	is	not	the	only	amusing	or	insightful	bit	of	Rey’s	discussion	of	Fodor,	but	it	is	the	one	that	best	suits	my	present	purposes.	2	See	Travieso	et	al.,	(2014,	p.	377).	3	See	Chemero	(2014,	pp.	355-9).	4	See	Gomila	et	al.	(2012);	Travieso	et	al.	(2014).	
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relevant,	as	they	speak	to	recent	attempts	to	explain	the	systematicity	of	thought	by	appeal	to	the	systematicity	of	language.		
1.	Productivity,	Systematicity,	and	the	Ad	Hoc		 The	productivity	of	a	natural	language,	such	as	English,	refers	to	the	hypothesis	that	there	is	no	finite	bound	on	the	length	of	a	sentence.		This	unbounded	character	might	be	suggested	by	sequences	such	as	the	following		 John	loves	Mary		 It’s	not	the	case	that	John	loves	Mary		 It’s	not	the	case	that	it’s	not	the	case	that	John	loves	Mary		 It’s	not	the	case	that	it’s	not	the	case	that	it’s	not	the	case	that	John	loves	Mary.			 This	is	the	house	that	Jack	built		 This	is	the	malt	that	lay	in	the	house	that	Jack	built		 This	is	the	rat	that	ate	the	malt	that	lay	in	the	house	that	Jack	built.		 This	is	the	cat	that	killed	the	rat	that	ate	the	malt	that	lay	in	the	house	that	Jack	built.	By	a	natural	idealization,	one	has	it	that	natural	languages	are	productive.5	There	is	no	point	where,	say,	adding	another	negation	converts	a	grammatical	sentence	of	English	into	an	ungrammatical	sentence.		One	gets	the	idea	that	thought	is	productive,	if	one	is	granted	the	assumption	that	speakers	of	a	natural	language	can	entertain	the	thoughts	expressed	in	their	natural	language.6			 Fodor	(1987)	and	Fodor	et	al.	(1988)	propose,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	not	to	rely	on	the	idealization	to	the	infinite	representational	capacities	invoked	in	the	productivity	argument.		Instead,	they	suppose	that	there	are	only	finitely	many	possible	occurrent	thoughts.7	Consider,	then,	in	Fodorian	style,	a	simplified	set	of	possible	occurrent	thoughts.	(1)	 John	loves	John		 John	loves	Mary		 Mary	loves	John		 Mary	loves	Mary.	Let	these	be	all	and	only	the	thoughts	that	might	occur	to	some	cognitive	agent.	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn	claim	that	such	a	set	has	two	features.	First,	some	of	the	thoughts	are	“intrinsically	connected.”	Second,	some	of	the	thoughts	are	semantically	related.8		For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	I																																																									5	Chomsky	(1956,	p.	15),	Chomsky	(1957,	pp.	23-4)	proposes	that	it	is	simplicity	in	the	grammar	that	motivates	the	view	that	natural	languages	are	productive.	6	Cf.	Fodor	et	al.	(1988,	p.	39);	Fodor	(1987,	p.	151)	where	the	systematicity	of	thought	is	inferred	from	the	systematicity	of	natural	language	along	with	the	assumption	that	understanding	a	sentence	of	one’s	natural	language	is	a	matter	of	thinking	the	thought	the	sentence	expresses.			7	The	discussion	that	follows	will	assume	only	that	it	is	occurrent	thoughts—thoughts	that	“come	to	mind”	so	to	speak—that	are	systematic.		The	reason	is	that	dispositional	thoughts	might	be	stored	in	another	format	that	is	used	to	construct	occurrent	thoughts.	McLaughlin	(2009,	p.	254)	however,	proposes	that	systematicity	extends	to	all	thoughts.	8	Fodor	et	al.	(1988)	describe	the	first	feature	as	“the	systematicity	of	cognitive	representations,”	(section	3.2)	and	the	second	as	“the	compositionality	of	representations.”		(section	3.3).	
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believe,	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn	focus	on	pairs	of	thoughts,	such	as	John	loves	Mary	and	Mary	loves	John.		We	might	understand	the	“intrinsic	connection”	between	them	as	one	of	counterfactual	dependence.		The	agent	would	not	have	the	capacity	to	think	that	John	loves	Mary	unless	she	had	the	capacity	to	think	that	Mary	loves	John,	and	vice	versa.9		To	say	that	thoughts	are	semantically	related	is	to	say,	to	a	first	approximation,	that	they	are	about	the	same	individuals	in	the	same	relation.				 I	take	it	that	interests	of	simplicity	are	behind	the	focus	on	such	pairs.		First	of	all,	the	point	is	not	about	pairs	per	se.		All	the	members	of	the	following	cluster	of	thoughts	are	putatively	counterfactually	dependent	and	semantically	related:	(2)	 John	introduced	Mary	to	Bob		 John	introduced	Bob	to	Mary		 Mary	introduced	John	to	Bob		 Mary	introduced	Bob	to	John		 Bob	introduced	John	to	Mary		 Bob	introduced	Mary	to	John10	Second,	consider	the	intrinsic	connections	among	the	thoughts	in	(1).	The	thought	that	John	loves	Mary	and	the	thought	that	John	loves	John	are	(presumably)	not	mutually	counterfactually	dependent,	since	one	might	have	the	capacity	to	have	the	thought	that	John	loves	John,	without	having	the	capacity	to	have	the	thought	that	John	loves	Mary.		One	might	not	have	the	concept	of	Mary.		Third,	consider	semantic	relatedness.		The	thought	that	John	loves	Mary	and	that	John	loves	John	does	not	have	the	same	individuals	in	the	same	relations.		The	first	thought	is	about	Mary,	where	the	second	is	not.		So,	even	though	Fodor	evidently	presupposes	that	the	set	of	possible	occurrent	thoughts	is	something	like	(1),	he	does	not	try	to	provide	a	characterization	of	the	“intrinsic	connections”	and	semantic	relations	among	all	the	thoughts	in	the	set.		 Note	that	sometimes	Fodor,	Pylyshyn,	and	McLaughlin	propose	something	somewhat	stronger	than	we	have	set	out	above.11		They	propose,	roughly,	that	one	does	not	find	cognitive	agents	who	can	think	that	thought	that	aRb,	unless	they	can	think	the	thought	that	bRa.		This	is	a	stronger	claim	than	what	we	have	set	out	above	insofar	as	it	implicitly	assumes	that	the	schematic	letters	“a”	and	“b”	can	take	on	any	individuals	and	“R”	any	relations	as	instances.		This	stronger	claim	has,	of	course,	invited	various	putative	counterexamples.12	It	has	also																																																									9	McLaughlin	(2014,	p.	33),	Ramsey	(2014,	p.	255)	accept	this	way	of	understanding	systematicity.	McLaughlin	(2009)	also	treats	these	in	terms	of	“systematicity	laws”.		Fleshing	out	the	idea	of	“intrinsic	connection”	in	terms	of	counterfactual	dependence	may	help	dispel	the	sense	that	the	explanandum	presupposes	that	the	thoughts	have	the	same	components,	thus	begging	a	question	in	favor	of	a	syntactically	and	semantically	compositional	language	of	thought.	(Cf.	Matthews	(1994,	p.	355)	regarding	question	begging.	See	McLaughlin	(2009,	p.	257f)	for	a	reply.)	10	McLaughlin	notes	“The	idea	that	thought	abilities	come	in	clusters	can	be	captured	by	saying	that	they	come	in	pairs”	(McLaughlin,	2009,	p.	253).		I	read	him	as	saying	that	you	can	get	the	point	of	counterfactual	dependence	by	looking	to	pairs;	not	that	one	must	explicate	counterfactual	dependence	by	looking	to	pairs.	11	Cf,	e.g.,	Fodor	et	al.	(1988,	pp.	40,	44);	Fodor	et	al.	(1990,	p.	202);	McLaughlin	(2009,	p.	254).	12	Cf,	e.g.,	Matthews	(1997,	p.	162),	Johnson	(2004),	Travieso	et	al.	(2014,	p.	378).	For	a	defense	of	this	stronger	claim	about	systematicity,	see	McLaughlin	(2009).	
	 4	
invited	questions	about	just	how	pervasive	these	intrinsic	connections	are	supposed	to	be.13	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn,	however,	are	aware	of	the	“patchiness,”	we	might	call	it,	of	the	intrinsic	connections	and	semantic	relations:	“It's	uncertain	exactly	how	compositional	natural	languages	actually	are	(just	as	it's	uncertain	exactly	how	systematic	they	are)”	(ibid.	p.	42.)		Fodor	elsewhere	suggests	that	a	precise	characterization	is	unnecessary.	“Just	a	little	systematicity	of	thought	will	do	to	make	things	hard	for	Aunty,	since,	as	previously	remarked,	[rival	conceptions]	are	compatible	with	there	being	no	systematicity	of	thought	at	all”	(Fodor,	1987,	p.	153.)		Fodor’s	point,	in	this	last,	reinforces	what	I	take	to	be	his	intent	in	focusing	on	pairs	of	thought	capacities	in	order	to	run	his	argument.		The	upshot,	perhaps,	is	that	the	challenge	of	the	systematicity	arguments	is	not	so	much	to	explain	why	thought	is	systematic,	but	to	explain	why	thought	is	as	systematic	as	it	is.		In	more	detail,	the	challenge	is	not	so	much	to	explain	why	there	are	intrinsic	connections/semantic	relations	between	thoughts,	but	to	explain	why	there	are	as	many	intrinsic	connections/semantics	relations	between	thoughts	as	there	are.		Why,	one	might	ask	critics,	is	this	not	a	perfectly	good	challenge?		 Fodor	and	Pylyshyn	propose	that	cognitive	representations	have	a	combinatorial	syntax	and	semantics.		Cognitive	representations	constitute	a	language	of	thought.		Oversimplifying,	the	meanings	of	some	cognitive	representations	(i.e.	molecular	representations)	are	determined	by	the	meanings	of	atomic	representations	and	the	way	in	which	those	atomic	representations	are	put	together.		So,	we	might	have	{John,	loves,	Mary}	as	our	syntactic	atoms	with	the	obvious	meanings	and	a	single	cognitive-grammatical	construct.		Fodor	and	Pylyshyn	implicitly	presuppose	that	this	syntactically	and	semantically	combinatorial	language	of	thought	bests	all	comers	as	an	account	of	the	structure	of	cognitive	representation,	so	that,	for	purposes	of	illuminating	how	the	systematicity	arguments	work,	we	might	consider	a	very	simple	rival	hypothesis,	namely,	that	all	cognitive	representations	have	an	atomic	semantic	and	syntactic	structure.14		Let	the	atomic	symbols	be	{¨,	©,	§,	ª}	with	the	meanings	John	loves	John,	John	loves	Mary,	Mary	loves	John,	and	Mary	loves	Mary.		Following	(Fodor,	1987),	let	us	call	this	very	simple	hypothesis	“Intentional	Realism.”		 Consider	the	language	of	thought	explanation	of	the	intrinsic	connections	among	possible	occurrent	thoughts.		According	to	the	language	of	thought	story,	if	our	hypothetical	cognitive	agent	were	to	lose	the	capacity	to	think	that	John	loves	Mary,	this	could	be	because	the	agent	lost	the	concept	of	John,	or	of	loves,	or	of	Mary,	or	the	grammatical	construction	that	forms	the	thought	that	John	loves	Mary.		But,	if	the	agent	were	to	lose	one	of	those	things,	then	the	agent	would	thereby	lose	the	capacity	to	form	the	thought	that	Mary	loves	John.		Similarly,	if	the	agent	were	to	have	the	capacity	for	the	thought	that	John	loves	Mary,	then	the	agent	must	have	the	concept	of	John,	the	concept	of	loves,	the	concept	of	Mary,	and	the	grammatical	construct	that	forms	the	thought	that	John	loves	Mary.		But,	a	cognitive	agent	that	has	all	that	would	thereby	have	the	capacity	to	form	the	thought	that	Mary	loves	John.		Here	we	have	a	straightforward	explanation	of	the	counterfactual	dependence	between	the	thoughts.		What,	however,	would	be	the	Intentional	Realist	account?		Why	would	losing	the	symbol	©,	meaning	John	loves	Mary,	have	any	implications	for	losing	the	symbol	§,	meaning	Mary	loves	John?		There	is	no	account.	
																																																								13	See	Chemero	(2014).	14	Ramsey	(2014,	p.	258)	concurs	that	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn	mean	to	take	on	all	rivals.	
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	 Consider	the	language	of	thought	explanation	of	the	semantic	relatedness	of	possible	occurrent	thoughts.	In	theory,	one	could	have	an	agent	whose	possible	occurrent	thoughts	are	{John	loves	Mary,	bears	sleep	in	the	woods,	Einstein	was	a	physicist}.		But,	one	does	not	find	such	agents.	Why?	Because	the	stock	of	possible	occurrent	thoughts	is	built	up	out	of	a	stock	of	syntactic	and	semantic	atoms	that	form	a	set	of	semantically	related	thoughts.	What,	however,	would	be	the	Intentional	realist	account?	Why	would	the	stock	of	symbols	be	semantically	related,	rather	than	not?		 Notice	that	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn,	on	the	one	hand,	devote	one	section	of	their	paper	to	the	intrinsic	connections	among	thoughts	and	another	to	the	semantic	relatedness	of	thoughts.	This	suggests	that	they	are	supposed	to	be	separate	explananda.	On	the	other	hand,	they	claim	that,	“Compositionality	is	closely	related	to	systematicity;	perhaps	they're	best	viewed	as	aspects	of	a	single	phenomenon.”	Then,	later,	they	expand	upon	this,		We	now	add	that	which	sentences	are	systematically	related	is	not	arbitrary	from	a	semantic	point	of	view.	For	example,	being	able	to	understand	'John	loves	the	girl'	goes	along	with	being	able	to	understand	'the	girl	loves	John',	and	there	are	correspondingly	close	semantic	relations	between	these	sentences:	in	order	for	the	first	to	be	true,	John	must	bear	to	the	girl	the	very	same	relation	that	the	truth	of	the	second	requires	the	girl	to	bear	to	John.	By	contrast,	there	is	no	intrinsic	connection	between	understanding	either	of	the	John/girl	sentences	and	understanding	semantically	unrelated	formulas	like	'quarks	are	made	of	gluons'	or	'the	cat	is	on	the	mat'	or	'2	+	2	=	4';	it	looks	as	though	semantical	relatedness	and	systematicity	keep	quite	close	company.	(Fodor	et	al.,	1988,	pp.	41-2;	cf.,	Fodor	et	al.,	1990,	p.	202).	This	later	passage	obviously	suggests	an	intimate	connection	between	the	two	explananda.		Here	is	an	interpretation	of	what	is	going	on.		Fodor	and	Pylyshyn	seem	to	have	in	mind	three	distinct	psychological	features	to	be	explained.		First,	there	are	intrinsic	connections	between	some	possible	occurrent	thoughts.		Second,	there	are	semantic	relations	among	some	possible	occurrent	thoughts.		And,	third,	the	possible	occurrent	thoughts	that	are	intrinsically	connected	are	also	semantically	related.		John	loves	Mary	and	Mary	loves	John	are	intrinsically	connected	and	semantically	related.	Why?	There	is	no	conceptual	or	logical	connection	between	intrinsic	connectedness	and	semantic	relatedness.	In	principle,	one	could	have	a	cognitive	agent	in	which	there	are	thoughts	that	are	intrinsically	connected,	but	not	semantically	related.	Such	a	cognitive	agent	might	be	such	that	its	capacity	to	think	that	John	loves	Mary	and	its	capacity	to	think	that	the	cat	is	on	the	mat	are	intrinsically	connected,	but	they	are	clearly	not	semantically	related	in	the	relevant	sense.		Moreover,	in	principle	one	could	have	a	cognitive	agent	in	which	there	are	thoughts	that	are	semantically	related,	but	which	are	not	intrinsically	connected.	Such	an	agent	might	have	the	capacities	to	think	that	John	loves	Mary	and	Mary	loves	John,	but	is	such	that	neither	thought	is	counterfactually	dependent	on	the	other.		But,	given	that	intrinsic	connectedness	and	semantic	relatedness	do	go	hand	in	hand,	a	cognitive	scientist	should	have	an	explanation	of	this.	But,	the	language	of	thought	story	given	in	the	last	paragraph	gives	an	answer	to	this.		The	language	of	thought	explanation	of	the	intrinsic	connection	between	thoughts	yields	an	explanation	of	their	semantic	relatedness	“for	free”	one	might	say.		Once	one	has	in	place	the	language	of	thought	account	of	the	intrinsic	connections	between	possible	occurrent	thoughts,	one	needs	no	additional	hypotheses	to	explain	the	semantic	relatedness	of	possible	occurrent	thoughts.		There	is	a	simple,	non-ad	hoc	account	of	why	intrinsically	connected	thoughts	are	semantically	related.	This	is	what	seems	to	underlie	
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the	sense	in	which	the	language	of	thought	hypothesis	is	supposed	to	be	the	best	explanation	of	the	systematic	features	of	thought.15		 This	pass	through	the	systematicity	arguments	has	no	references	to	any	background	linguistics	literature	on	systematicity.	But,	even	a	casual	reader	of	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn’s	discussion	will	notice	the	references	to	Chomskyan	ideas	in	generative	linguistics.		In	what	remains	of	this	paper,	I	will	try	to	provide	what	seem	to	be	some	of	the	salient	features	of	this	background	in	order	to	elaborate	on	some	of	the	finer	points	of	the	systematicity	arguments.	I	do	not	mean	to	claim	that	Fodor	borrows	the	systematicity	arguments	from	Chomsky	or	from	theories	of	transformational	grammar.		Instead,	Fodor	draws	on	some	of	the	implicit	ideas	in	linguistics	to	develop	the	systematicity	arguments.		 	
2.	Why	Believe	Language	and	Thought	have	Systematic	Features?		 While	some	have	suggested	that	the	intrinsic	connections	and	semantic	relations	among	thoughts	is	a	myth,	I	propose	to	flesh	out	Fodor’s	claim	that	the	principal	ideas	of	the	systematic	arguments	may	be	found	in	the	earlier	discussions	of	the	productivity	of	natural	language.	Consider	Chomsky’s	following	contention:	The	central	fact	to	which	any	significant	linguistic	theory	must	address	itself	is	this:	a	mature	speaker	can	produce	a	new	sentence	of	his	language	on	the	appropriate	occasion,	and	other	speakers	can	understand	it	immediately,	though	it	is	equally	new	to	them.		Most	of	our	linguistic	experience,	both	as	speakers	and	hearers,	is	with	new	sentences.	(Chomsky,	1964,	p.	50).	Notice	that	this	contention	does	not	presuppose	that	language	is	productive.		It	could	be	that	speakers/hearers	are	able	to	cope	with	novel	sentences,	because	there	are	infinitely	many	of	them.		Or,	it	could	be	because	there	is	a	large,	but	finite	number	of	them.		Notice	what	Chomsky’s	“central	fact”	implies.		Given	experience	with	a	finite	sample	of	sentences	from	a	natural	language,	speakers	develop	the	capacity	to	produce/understand	many—perhaps	infinitely	many—novel	sentences.		Given	experience	with	a	sample	of	English	sentences,	children	will	“extrapolate”	from	their	sample	to	many,	many	new	sentences.		Thus,	there	appears	to	be	a	counterfactual	dependence	between	the	production/understanding	of	some	sentences	and	the	production/understanding	of	others.		 There	is	little	doubt	that	Fodor	was	aware	of	this	putative	“central	fact,”	as	Chomsky’s	paper	appeared	in	the	(Fodor	et	al.,	1964)	anthology.		Moreover,	Katz	et	al.	(1963)	(reprinted	in	the	anthology	along	with	Chomsky’s	paper)	expand	on	Chomsky’s	point	in	the	following:	A	fluent	speaker’s	mastery	of	his	language	exhibits	itself	in	his	ability	to	produce	and	understand	the	sentences	of	his	language,	INCLUDING	INDEFINITELY	MANY	THAT	ARE	WHOLLY	NOVEL	TO	HIM	…	The	emphasis	upon	novel	sentences	is	important.		The	most	characteristic	feature	of	language	is	its	ability	to	make	available	an	infinity	of	sentences	from	which	the	speaker	can	select	appropriate	and	novel	ones	to	use	as	the	need	arises.	That	is	to	say,	what	qualifies	one	as	a	fluent	speaker	is	not	the	ability	to	imitate	previously	heard	sentences	but	rather	the	ability	to	produce	and	understand	sentences	never	before	encountered.	The	striking	fact	about	the	use	of	language	is	the	absence	of	repetition—almost	every	sentence	uttered	is	uttered	to	the	first	time.	This	can	be	substantiated	by	checking	texts	for	the	number	of	times	a	sentence	is	repeated.	It	is	exceedingly	unlikely	that	even	a	single	repetition	of	a	sentence	of	reasonable	length	will																																																									15	Cf.,	Fodor	(1987,	p.	149);	Aizawa	(1997,	p.	117);	Aizawa	(2003,	Chapter	2).	
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be	encountered.		…		Since	a	fluent	speaker	is	able	to	use	and	understand	any	sentence	drawn	from	the	infinite	set	of	sentences	of	his	language,	and	since,	at	any	given	time,	he	has	only	encountered	a	finite	set	of	sentences,	it	follows	that	the	speaker’s	knowledge	of	his	language	takes	the	form	of	rules	which	project	the	finite	set	of	sentences	he	has	fortuitously	encounters	to	the	infinite	set	of	sentences	of	the	language.	(Katz	et	al.,	1964,	pp.	481-2).	Here	Katz	and	Fodor	embraced	what	was	the	going	conclusion	of	the	day,	namely,	that	the	set	of	sentences	of	a	natural	language	is	infinite,	but,	as	noted	above,	that	is	an	inessential	feature	of	the	argument	for	a	compositional	basis	to	natural	language.		The	principal	point	is	that	language	acquisition	involves	taking	a	finite	set	of	sentences,	and	then	extrapolating	to	a	larger	set.			 		 But,	what	are	these	extrapolations	like?		Again,	simplifying	in	Fodorian	fashion,	we	might	have	at	one	time	the	set	of	producible/understandable	sentences	(3)	 “John	loves	John”		 “John	loves	Mary”		 “Mary	loves	John”		 “Mary	loves	Mary”.	But,	then,	the	agent	learns	the	word	“likes,”	from	“John	likes	Mary,”	so	that	the	set	of	producible/understandable	sentences	becomes		(4)	 “John	loves	John”	 	 	 	 “John	likes	John”		 “John	loves	Mary”	 	 	 	 “John	likes	Mary”		 “Mary	loves	John”	 	 	 	 “Mary	likes	John”		 “Mary	loves	Mary”.	 	 	 	 “Mary	likes	Mary”	But,	then,	at	a	later	stage,	the	agent	learns,	say,	the	passive	grammatical	construction,	so	that	the	set	of	producible/understandable	sentences	is	(5)	 “John	loves	John”	 	 	 	 “John	likes	John”		 “John	loves	Mary”	 	 	 	 “John	likes	Mary”		 “Mary	loves	John”	 	 	 	 “Mary	likes	John”		 “Mary	loves	Mary”.	 	 	 	 “Mary	likes	Mary”		 “John	is	loved	by	John”	 	 	 “John	is	liked	by	John”		 “John	is	loved	by	Mary”	 	 	 “John	is	liked	by	Mary”		 “Mary	is	loved	by	John”	 	 	 “Mary	is	liked	by	John”		 “Mary	is	loved	by	Mary”	 	 	 “Mary	is	like	by	Mary.”	At	each	stage,	there	will	be	pairs	of	sentences	that	are	intrinsically	connected	and	semantically	related.		So,	in	(5),	there	will	be			 “John	loves	Mary”	and	“Mary	loves	John,”			 “John	likes	Mary”	and	“Mary	likes	John,”			 “John	is	loved	by	Mary”	and	“Mary	is	loved	by	John”,	and		 “John	is	liked	by	Mary”	and	“Mary	is	liked	by	John”16	Notice	that	that	there	are	two	types	of	counterfactual	dependencies	in	play	here.		One	is	diachronic;	the	other	synchronic.		So,	there	is	a	diachronic	dependence	between	an	agent’s																																																									16	Travieso	et	al.	(2014)	note	that	“John	loves	Mary”	and	“Mary	is	loved	by	John”	are	not	counterfactually	dependent,	since	speakers	typically	acquire	the	former	years	before	the	latter.	That	is,	of	course,	right,	but	misinterprets	which	pairs	Fodor	supposed	to	be	both	semantically	related	and	counterfactually	dependent.	
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encounter	with	the	sentence,	say,	“John	likes	Mary”	at	time	t0	and	the	possession	of	all	the	“like	sentences”	in	(4)	at	a	later	time	t1.		The	agent	would	not	have	all	the	members	in	the	set	(4)	at	t1	if	the	agent	had	not	encountered	“John	likes	Mary”	at	t0.		The	intrinsic	connection	of	interest	in	the	systematicity	arguments,	however,	is	synchronic.			The	idea	is	that	the	agent	would	not	have	the	capacity	to	produce/understand	the	sentence	“John	loves	Mary”	at	time	t0	if	the	agent	did	not	have	the	capacity	to	produce/understand	the	sentence	“Mary	loves	John”	at	time	t0,	and	
vice	versa.17		 But,	what	mechanism	enables	this	pattern	of	extrapolation?		Katz	and	Fodor	propose	that,	“This	problem	requires	for	its	solution	a	rule	which	projects	the	infinite	set	of	sentences	in	a	way	which	mirrors	the	way	speakers	understand	novel	sentences.		In	encountering	a	novel	sentence,	the	speaker	is	not	encountering	novel	elements	but	only	a	novel	combination	of	familiar	elements.”	(Katz	et	al.,	1963,	p.	171).	The	elements	here	are	the	words	or	morphemes	of	the	language	and	the	grammatical	structures	underlying	them.		So,	one	can	see	in	this	argument	that	there	will	be	counterfactual	dependencies	and	semantic	relations	among	some	of	the	pairs	of	sentences	a	speaker	can	understand.		Indeed,	one	can	see	that,	on	this	account,	the	sentences	that	are	counterfactually	dependent	are	also	semantically	related.		 At	the	risk	of	belaboring	Fodor’s	familiarity	with	this	argument,	we	might	note	the	following	from	one	of	Fodor’s	earliest	papers:	Nevertheless,	it	seems	that	some	aspects	of	the	ability	to	understand	and	produce	novel	sentences	may	be	characterized	in	terms	of	our	present	knowledge	about	the	systematic	relations	of	sentences	in	natural	languages.	To	give	one	example:	it	is	clearly	a	necessary	condition	for	understanding	a	new	sentence	that	one	should	be	implicitly	capable	of	giving	a	grammatical	analysis	of	the	sentence.	This	involves	at	least	the	ability	to	decide	correctly	upon	those	substitutions	for	various	components	of	the	sentence	which	preserve	grammaticality.	The	set	of	such	substitutions,	however,	partially	determines	the	relation	between	the	sentence	in	question	and	other	sentences	in	the	language.	Thus,	understanding			 1.	The	boy	went	to	the	store		involves	knowing	such	facts	as	that			 2.	The	girl	went	to	the	store		is	a	grammatical	sentence	in	English	while			 3.	The	gives	went	to	the	store		is	not.	(Fodor	1961,	73).	It	is	striking	that	Fodor	uses	the	word	“systematic”	to	describe	these	relations.		This	use	seems	to	hark	back	to	Fodor’s	talk	of	“intrinsic	connections”	between	thoughts	as	in	(1)	above,	but	not	the	idea	of	counterfactual	dependence	between	thoughts	as	found	in	this,	and	many	other	passages	like	it:		What	does	it	mean	to	say	that	thought	is	systematic?	Well,	just	as	you	don't	find	people	who	can	understand	the	sentence	'John	loves	the	girl'	but	not	the	sentence	'the	girl	loves	John,'	so	too	you	don't	find	people	who	can	think	the	thought	that	John	loves	the	girl	but	can't	think	the	thought	that	the	girl	loves	John.	Indeed,	in	the	case	of	verbal	organisms	the	systematicity	of	thought	follows	from	the	systematicity	of	language	if	you	assume-as	most	psychologists	do-that	understanding	a	sentence	involves	entertaining	the	thought																																																									17	NB.	The	diachronic	counterfactual	dependence	is	asymmetric,	where	the	synchronic	counterfactual	dependence	is	symmetric.	
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that	it	expresses;	on	that	assumption,	nobody	could	understand	both	the	sentences	about	John	and	the	girl	unless	he	were	able	to	think	both	the	thoughts	about	John	and	the	girl.	(Fodor	et	al.,	1988,	p.	39;	cf.,	Fodor	&	Pylyshyn,	1988,	pp.	41-2,	quoted	above).	It	might	have	been	helpful	had	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn	provided	a	reference	to	Fodor	(1961),	Katz	et	al.	(1963),	or	Chomsky	(1964).	Nevertheless,	if	one	were	to	take	Fodor	and	Pylyshyn	at	their	word	that	there	were	productivity	arguments	for	a	combinatorial	syntax	and	semantic	in	natural	language,	one	could	track	them	down.		 It	is	probably	worthwhile	to	note	three	points	where	the	ideas	and	arguments	of	Chomsky’s	and	Fodor’s	early	writings	differ	from	what	appears	in	the	systematicity	arguments.	First,	and	most	obviously,	the	early	arguments	were	concerned	with	the	productivity	of	natural	language,	hence	the	combinatorial	syntax	and	semantics	of	natural	language,	whereas	the	later	arguments	are	concerned	with	the	productivity	and	systematicity	of	thought.	Second,	in	the	early	arguments,	Fodor	and	Chomsky	relied	on	the	novelty	of	sentences	encountered.		As	noted	above,	sentences	could	generally	be	novel	whether	there	were	finitely	or	infinitely	many	of	them.		And	this	would	seem	to	form	a	perfectly	sound	basis	for	a	systematicity	argument.		Yet,	it	is	probably	only	a	manifestation	of	Fodor’s	idiosyncratic	style	to	push	the	envelope	so	as	not	to	rely	on	the	novelty	of	encountered	sentences	at	all.		Instead,	he	could	make	do	with	homely	examples,	such	as	“John	loves	the	girl”	and	“The	girl	loves	John,”	and	that	anyone	who	understands	the	sentence	“John	loves	the	girl,”	will	ipso	facto	extrapolate	to	an	understanding	of	“The	girl	loves	John.”		Third,	in	the	passage	from	Fodor	(1961)	cited	above,	Fodor	took	the	ability	to	give	a	grammatical	analysis	of	a	sentence	to	be	constitutive	of	the	ability	to	understand	that	sentence.		Roughly	speaking,	if	you	cannot	assign	a	parse	tree	to	a	sentence,	you	do	not	understand	that	sentence.		So,	a	tourist	who	can	produce	a	sound	string	does	not	thereby	have	a	fluent	speaker’s	understanding	of	a	corresponding	sentence.18		One	need	not	embrace	this,	however,	in	order	to	appreciate	the	force	of	the	systematicity	arguments.		
3.	Inference	to	the	Best	Explanation	in	Generative	Linguistics		 Turn	now	to	another	bit	of	the	background	to	Fodor’s	presuppositions	in	the	systematicity	arguments.		Chomsky’s	“Three	models	for	the	description	of	language”	(Chomsky,	1956),	and	Syntactic	Structures	(Chomsky,	1957),	are	among	the	seminal	contributions	to	the	cognitive	revolution.		In	his	introduction	to	the	second	edition,	in	2002,	for	example,	David	Lightfoot	described	Syntactic	Structures	as	“the	snowball	which	began	the	avalanche	of	the	modern	‘cognitive	revolution’”	(Lightfoot,	2002,	v).	These	works	were	surely	well	understood	by	Fodor.	They	were,	for	example,	part	of	the	background	to	Katz	et	al.	(1963).	Moreover,	Fodor	(1961)	cites	Syntactic	Structures	as	part	of	the	theoretical	backdrop	to	his	paper.		 Although	Chomsky	allows	that	a	language	may	either	be	finite	or	infinite,	he	maintains	that	human	natural	languages	are	unbounded.		The	human	mind	being	finite,	however,	there	must	be	finite	means	for	generating	and	understanding	each	of	the	sentences	of	the	language.		The	first	model	Chomsky	examines	for	the	description	of	natural	languages	is	that	they	are	given	by	so-called	“finite	state	models.”		(Cf.,	Chomsky,	1956,	section	2;	Chomsky,	1957,	chapter	3.)		Chomsky	argues	against	the	adequacy	of	such	models	on	the	grounds	that	they	do	not	generate	many	of	a	wide	range	of	types	of	sentences	found	in	English.		To	borrow	some	later	terminology,	Chomsky	would	say	that	finite	state	grammars	are	observationally	inadequate	(Cf.,	Chomsky,	1964,	p.	53).																																																									18	Cf.,	Fodor,	1987,	p.	149.	
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	 In	the	initial	formulation	of	the	argument	against	finite	state	models,	Chomsky	presupposes	that	there	is	no	finite	bound	on	the	length	of	a	sentence,	in	other	words,	that	English	is	productive.		Later,	he	entertains	the	hypothesis	that	there	is	a	finite	bound	on	the	length	of	an	English	sentence.		So,	at	some	point,	one	would	find	that,	say,	“Carl	and	Fred	and	Larry	and	Tom	ate	the	cheese”	is	an	English	sentence,	but	“Carl	and	Fred	and	Larry	and	Tom	and	Ken	ate	the	cheese”	is	not.		Such	a	move	is	comparable	to	Fodor’s	setting	aside	the	productivity	of	thought	in	favor	of	considerations	of	intrinsic	connectedness	and	semantic	relatedness.	Of	the	possibility	of	a	finite	bound	on	sentence	length,	Chomsky	writes,	Such	arbitrary	limitations	serve	no	useful	purpose,	however.		If	these	processes	have	no	finite	limit,	we	can	prove	the	literal	inapplicability	of	the	[finite	state]	theory.		If	the	processes	have	a	limit,	then	the	construction	of	a	finite	state	grammar	will	not	be	literally	out	of	the	question,	since	it	will	be	possible	to	list	the	sentences,	and	a	list	is	essentially	a	trivial	finite	state	grammar.		But	this	grammar	will	be	so	complex	that	it	will	be	of	little	use	or	interest.	If	there	is	no	finite	limit	on	the	length	of	sentences—if	it	is	admitted	that	natural	language	is	productive,	then	the	model	of	language	is	“literally	inapplicable”	per	the	argument	above.		It	is	observationally	inadequate.		If,	however,	there	is	a	finite	bound	on	sentence	length,	then	the	grammar	would	be	of	the	sort	postulated	by	the	Intentional	Realist	in	section	1	above,	namely,	the	well-formed	strings	of	the	language	are	just	{¨,	©,	§,	ª,	…}.			Such	a	grammar,	used	for	a	genuinely	significant	fraction	of	English	“would	serve	no	useful	purpose”	and	“will	be	so	complex	as	to	be	of	little	use	or	interest.”	Chomsky,	thus,	thinks	that	there	is	more	to	having	a	good	grammar—a	good	system	of	representation—over	and	above	mere	generative	capacity.		There	is	more	to	having	a	good	account	of	a	system	of	representation	than	merely	providing	for	observational	adequacy.		A	better	account	is	one	that	is,	in	some	sense,	simpler.		 Finite	state	grammars	were	only	the	first	of	three	models	Chomsky	considered.		In	addition,	there	are	phrase	structure	grammars	and	transformational	grammars.		Chomsky	prefaces	his	case	for	transformational	grammars	over	simpler	phrase	structure	grammars	with	the	following:	The	strongest	possible	proof	of	the	inadequacy	of	a	linguistic	theory	is	to	show	that	it	literally	cannot	apply	to	some	natural	language.		A	weaker,	but	perfectly	sufficient	demonstration	of	inadequacy	would	be	to	show	that	the	theory	can	apply	only	clumsily;	that	is,	to	show	that	any	grammar	that	can	be	constructed	in	terms	of	this	theory	will	be	extremely	complex,	ad	hoc,	and	‘unrevealing’.	(Chomsky,	1957,	p.	34).	So,	there	are	(at	least)	two	grounds	upon	which	a	representational	system	can	be	faulted.		First,	it	might	be	faulted	for	not	being	able	to	represent	all	that	needs	to	be	represented.		This	was	the	problem	facing	“grammars”	that	are	mere	lists.		One	might	say	that	such	a	grammar	does	not	provide	an	explanation	of	why	certain	strings	are	members	of	a	language.		Second,	a	representational	can	be	faulted	for	being	ad	hoc	or	for	being	excessively	complex.		This	was	the	problem	facing	phrase	structure	grammars	versus	transformational	grammars.		And,	we	might	understand	an	ad	hoc	complex	explanation	to	be	worse	than	a	non-ad	hoc	simple	explanation.		An	ad	hoc	complex	explanation	is	not	one	we	would	infer	through	an	inference	to	the	best	explanation.		 Return	now	to	the	way	in	which	Fodor	is	implicitly	relying,	not	on	observational	adequacy,	but	to	some	standard	of	better	explanation.		Recall	the	claim	that	No	doubt	it	is	possible	…	to	wire	a	network	so	that	it	supports	a	vector	that	represents	aRb	if	and	only	if	it	supports	a	vector	that	represents	bRa;	…	The	trouble	is	that,	
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although	the	architecture	permits	this,	it	equally	permits	Smolensky	to	wire	a	network	so	that	it	supports	a	vector	that	represents	aRb	if	and	only	if	it	supports	a	vector	that	represents	zSq.		(Fodor	et	al.,	1990,	p.	202).19	The	idea	is	that	one	might	get	a	system	that	can	represent	both	aRb	and	bRa,	hence	be	observationally	adequate	and	have	thoughts	that	are	semantically	related.		And,	one	might	also	have	it	be	the	case	that	these	representations	are	counterfactually	dependent.		But,	in	addition,	one	wants	some	explanation	of	why	it	is	that	the	thoughts	that	are	semantically	related	are	also	counterfactually	dependent.		Why	do	these	two	features	of	thought	go	together?		On	the	language	of	thought	hypothesis,	the	claim	is	that	once	one	has	on	board	what	is	needed	in	order	to	explain	the	counterfactual	dependencies	in	thought,	one	has	on	board	what	one	needs	in	order	to	explain	the	semantic	relatedness	of	possible	thoughts	(and	vice	versa).		One	needs	no	“extra	assumptions”.		The	language	of	thought	explanation	is,	in	that	sense,	simpler.		It	is	not,	in	that	sense,	ad	hoc.20		 	
4.	The	“Central	Fact”	about	Language	is	Still	Worthy	of	Attention		 Consider,	now,	how	Chomsky’s	“central	fact”	about	language	might	bear	on	more	recent	attempts	to	deal	with	the	systematicity	arguments.	Gomila	et	al.	(2012,	pp.	102-3)	and	Travieso	et	al.	(2014,	pp.	373-4)	propose	that	the	systematicity	challenge	is	to	provide	a	genetic	explanation	of	why	thought	is	systematic	and	that	the	correct	explanation	is	that	the	systematicity	of	thought	is	induced	by	the	systematicity	of	natural	language.		In	more	detail,	they	seem	to	think	that	thoughts	get	their	contents	from	language,	so	that	the	patterns	among	the	contents	of	possible	thoughts	arise	from	the	patterns	among	contents	of	sentences	in	the	agent’s	natural	language.21		So,	an	agent	comes	to	have	the	set	of	possible	occurrent	thoughts	{John	loves	John,	John	loves	Mary,	Mary	loves	John,	Mary	loves	Mary}	because	the	agent	has,	say,	the	set	of	possible	English	sentences	{“John	loves	John,”	“John	loves	Mary,”	“Mary	loves	John,”	“Mary	loves	Mary”}.		In	other	words,	they	propose	to	explain	the	content	relatedness	of	possible	occurrent	thoughts	in	terms	of	the	content	relatedness	of	possible	sentences	of	a	natural	language.				 Grant	them	this	for	a	moment.		This	still	leaves	the	counterfactual	dependence	among	thought	unexplained.		Why	is	it	that	there	is	a	counterfactual	dependence	between	the	John	loves	Mary	thought	and	the	Mary	loves	John	thought?		Travieso,	Gomila,	and	Lobo	provide	no	account.		Nor	do	they	provide	an	account	of	the	co-occurrence	of	counterfactual	dependence	and	semantic	relatedness.	 		 Now	take	back	what	was	granted	in	the	last	paragraph.		Of	course,	Gomila,	Travieso,	and	Lobo	can	claim	that	the	capacity	to	extrapolate	from	“John	loves	Mary”	to	“Mary	loves	John”	in	English	also	induces	the	capacity	to	extrapolate	from	the	thought	that	John	loves	Mary	to	the																																																									19	Cf.,	Fodor	et	al.,	1988,	p.	50;	Fodor	et	al.,	1990,	p.	202;	Ramsey,	2014,	pp.	255-6.	20	Aizawa,	1997,	2003)	try	to	provide	examples	from	the	history	of	science	that	illustrate	the	kind	of	reliance	on	ad	hoc	hypotheses	that	are	implicitly	taken	to	make	for	inferior	explanations.	21	They	actually	claim	only	an	“isomorphy”	between	the	sentences	of	natural	language	and	of	thoughts,	but	I	assume	they	want	synonymy.		“John	loves	Mary”	is	isomorphic	with	John	loves	Mary,	Mary	loves	John,	and	Bob	likes	Alice,	but	is	synonymous	only	with	the	first.		They	would	seem	to	mean	synonymy,	since	a	set	of	semantically	related	sentences	of	a	natural	language	could	be	isomorphic	with	a	set	of	semantically	unrelated	sentence	of	mentalese.	
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thought	that	Mary	loves	John	in	“mentalese.”		But,	that	claim	can’t	be	all	there	is	to	the	story.	Why,	as	things	stand,	is	this	not	a	mere	ad	hoc	stipulation?		Why	does	the	linguistic	extrapolation	enable	the	comparable	extrapolation	in	thought?		Why,	for	example,	doesn’t	the	linguistic	extrapolation	outstrip	the	extrapolation	in	thought?		Suppose	that	English	has	a	compositional	syntax	and	semantics,	but	that	thought	does	not.		Why,	then,	is	it	not	the	case	that	agents	have	the	capacity	to	parse	the	sentence	“John	loves	Mary”	and	therefrom	extrapolate	to	a	parse	tree	for	“Mary	loves	John,”	but	still	not	understand	(think	the	thought)	that	Mary	loves	John.		To	put	the	matter	another	way,	in	the	case	of	English,	one	would	have	a	combinatorial	explosion	in	the	number	of	possible	sentences	as	the	lexicon	increases	in	size,	but	why,	in	the	case	of	thought,	would	there	be	a	similar	combinatorial	explosion,	unless	there	were	in	fact	combinations	to	explode	in	number?		Again,	if	only	language	has	a	combinatorial	syntax	and	semantics,	then	it	would	seem	that	the	representational	resources	of	language	would	easily	outstrip	the	representational	resources	of	thought.	By	contrast,	according	to	the	language	of	thought	account,	the	explosive	growth	in	both	language	and	thought	is	possible	because	of	the	combinatorics	of	both.		But,	if	thought	has	a	combinatorial	syntax	and	semantics,	then	thought	would	have	a	language	of	thought.		 Another	way	of	putting	the	concern	here	is	that	Gomila	et	al.	seem	not	to	have	come	to	grips	with	the	apparent	implications	of	what	Chomsky	and	Fodor	took	to	be	the	“central	fact”	of	natural	language.		Why	is	it	that,	upon	exposure	to	a	finite	number	of	sentences,	a	speaker	is	able	to	produce	and	understand	(perhaps	non-denumerably)	many	novel	sentences?		The	Fodorian/Chomskyan	answer	is	that	natural	language	has	a	combinatorial	syntax	and	semantics.		But,	if	a	speaker	can	understand	all	of	these	sentences	of	her	natural	language,	then	how	it	is	that	thought	is	able	to	“keep	up”	with	language,	if	not	with	a	syntactically	and	semantically	combinatorial	language	of	thought?				
5.	Conclusion		 My	principal	aim	in	this	paper	was	to	look	at	the	systematicity	arguments	through	the	lens	of	some	of	Chomsky’s	and	Fodor’s	early	work	in	linguistics.		This	background	is	frequently	mentioned	in	Fodor’s	writings	on	systematicity	and	productivity,	but	has	not	been	given	the	kind	of	detailed	references	to	the	literature	that	would	help	a	newcomer	to	the	topic	easily	track	this	down.		Nor	has	this	background	been	reviewed	to	bring	out	its	relevance.		Nevertheless,	it	can	provide	us	a	better	understanding	of	Fodor’s	thinking	about	systematicity,	as	well	as	a	better	understanding	of	the	systematicity	arguments	for	a	language	of	thought	and	certain	attempts	to	reply	to	those	arguments.			
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